A new unit labour cost changes decomposition four pillars of cost competitiveness recovery by Peroni, Chiara & DiMaria, Charles Henri
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A new unit labour cost changes
decomposition four pillars of cost
competitiveness recovery
Chiara Peroni and Charles Henri DiMaria
STATEC
30. April 2012
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39882/
MPRA Paper No. 39882, posted 6. July 2012 22:05 UTC
A new unit labour cost changes decomposition
Four pillars of cost competitiveness recovery
Charles-Henri DiMaria and Chiara Peroni∗
Abstract
This article presents a new decomposition of unit labour costs into compensation per
worker and labour productivity, which, in turn, is decomposed into efficiency gains, tech-
nical progress and capital deepening. Data for Western European countries and the US
show that the evolution of labour productivity components counteracts the deterioration
in countries’ cost competitiveness caused by increases in nominal wages. The policy im-
plication is that efforts aimed at reducing nominal labour costs should be accompanied
by policies fostering capital deepening. Further improvements in countries’ cost compet-
itiveness can be achieved by enhancing efficiency gains and technical progress, which has
been mostly negative during the period under study.
KEYWORDS: unit labour cost, labour productivity, efficiency, technical change, cap-
ital deepening.
Competitiveness is high on the policy agenda. The recent crisis has highlighted structural
weaknesses of developed economies and re-fuelled a heated debate on the causes and reme-
dies to the high unemployment and deterioration in the economic performance of Western
European countries. The budgetary tightening dictated by the public debt crisis means that
limited resources are available to foster economic growth; furthermore, countries belonging to
a monetary union can no longer use competitive devaluation for expanding demand. Thus, for
members of the Euro zone, where monetary policy is committed to price stability, unit labour
costs are crucial to attain increased competitiveness (Collignon, 1999). As devaluation is no
longer possible and the EU strengthens fiscal discipline, it is proposed that economic recovery
should be achieved through labour market and wage bargaining adjustments (Barkbu et al.,
2012). The so-called internal devaluation proposal advocates a reduction in nominal wages
as essential to exit the crisis. Others question the relevance of such policy as there is no
conclusive empirical evidence showing that decreases in unit labour costs lead to the growth
of export shares (Felipe and Kumar, 2011).
This short article aims to clarify the link between labour costs and countries’ compet-
itiveness. In particular, it examines the link between cost competitiveness (intended as a
reduction in unit labour cost) and labour productivity and its determinants, and stresses
that the latter are important sources of competitiveness. Unit labour costs (ULC hereafter)
are defined as the ratio of total nominal cost per employee to real labour productivity. If in
a given country total nominal costs per employee increase faster than labour productivity,
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1 THE DECOMPOSITION OF UNIT LABOUR COSTS
then inflationary demand pressures may emerge and the country could lose competitiveness.
Thus, ULC changes reflect the comparative evolution of total nominal costs per employee
to labour productivity (e.g. Ark et al., 2005). In turn, following Kumar and Russell (2002),
labour productivity changes can be decomposed into three elements: efficiency changes, tech-
nical changes and capital deepening. This allows us to highlight four components of ULC,
which broadens policy perspective and enriches the analysis of ULC changes. Innovation,
investment in tangible and intangible capital, labour quality and business environment come
into play in a formalised manner through efficiency change, technological change and capital
deepening.
This article is organised as follows. The first section presents the decomposition of ULC,
and gives an economic interpretation of each of its components. Then, the following sec-
tion presents real data on the evolution of each term of the decomposition for 15 European
countries and the United States from 1995 to 2009. The last section concludes.
1 The decomposition of Unit Labour Costs
ULC is defined as total labour compensation (TLC) per unit of output (GDP).1 Dividing
each term by labour (L), ULC can be written as the ratio of compensation per employee to
labour productivity:2
ULCt =
TLCt/Lt
GDPt/Lt
(1)
Changes in ULC from t to t+1 can be written as follows:
ULCt+1
ULCt
=
TLCt+1/Lt+1
GDPt+1/Lt+1
TLCt/Lt
GDPt/Lt
(2)
Taking logs and rearranging terms one has:
d ln(ULCt+1) = d ln
TLCt+1
Lt+1
− d ln GDPt+1
Lt+1
(3)
(Here d denotes change in the logarithm from t to t+1.) The equation above shows that, in
order to recover cost competitiveness, a country could decrease labour cost and/or increase
labour productivity. Kumar and Russell (2002), in a framework that allows for inefficiency in
production, and assuming constant returns to scales technology, show that labour productivity
changes can be decomposed into efficiency changes (EFF), technical changes (TECH) and
capital deepening (CAP). ULC changes can be written as follows:
d ln(ULCt+1) = d ln
TLCt+1
Lt+1
− ln(EFF )t+1 − ln(TECH)t+1 − ln(CAP )t+1 (4)
1Whether total labour compensation is expressed in real or nominal terms, the reasoning presented in this
section remains the same.
2Ideally, a measure of ULC should be based on hours worked, especially for the purpose of international
comparisons. In practice, this is not feasible due to the lack of essential data. Another data limitation concerns
the composition of the workforce, which prevents us to take it into account into the computation of the TFP.
This is relevant as the labor factor is not homogeneous and the most skilled workers tend to have greater
productivity.
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The equation above shows that an increase in 1% in efficiency (or any other components of
labour productivity) lowers unit labour costs by about the same amount (ceteris paribus).
Conversely, any percentage increase in nominal compensation per worker will increase ULC
by the same amount. It should also be noted that a percent change in efficiency has the same
effect than one percent change in technical progress and capital deepening on ULC. (Efficient
countries, however, can only improve their ULC performance by technical change and capital
deepening.)
Positive efficiency changes mean that countries moves towards best practices (the techno-
logical frontier), or maximum feasible production given inputs use. This could be achieved
through improvements/changes in managerial practices, firms’ decision structure and learning
by doing. Such elements, under the control of the management, are among the determinants
of productivity identified by Syverson (2011).3
Technical change measures technical progress, or expansions in feasible production. Tech-
nical progress reflects the ability of countries to innovate, as it results from successful research
and development activities. It evolves with investments in intangible capital, which measures
the amount of knowledge and organisational capital and firm-specific skills. (Corrado et al.,
2009, highlight that intangibles are also a determinant of the evolution of efficiency.)
The first two components of labour productivity, efficiency and technical change, deter-
mine total factor productivity (TFP), which represents those productivity gains resulting
from efficiency in combining inputs to production. (In other words, higher TFP means that
one can produce more for any given combination of inputs.) As seen above, TFP changes
reflect a complex mix of elements such as increase in knowledge from innovation, investment
in intangible, organisational and managerial practises.
The last term, capital deepening, which summarises the contribution of the two inputs
to production, capital and labour, has received various interpretations. Pilat (2004) explains
that, when capital deepening increases, new capital is used, which introduces new technolo-
gies in the production process. The most interesting explanation of capital deepening is given
by Frankel (1962). This author argues that firms accumulate capital in response to market
conditions and economic opportunities. As a result, capital deepening increases reflect fac-
tors external to the firm that explain productivity changes, such as changes in regulatory
frameworks or flexible inputs markets.
The Kumar and Russell framework has become popular in interpreting and depicting the
evolution of labour productivity. Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2006) have developed a model
where the engine of growth is capital deepening. Others have focused on innovation and
technical progress as main determinants of growth (Romer, 1986, 1989). Empirically, it has
been found that a substantial part of labour productivity growth cannot be explained by
capital deepening (Fare et al., 1994).
The ULC decomposition of this section shows that increases in average compensation
of workers worsen competitiveness. Conversely, countries cost competitiveness improves fol-
lowing improvements in efficiency and/or the occurrence of technical change and/or capital
intensity increases.
The following section analyses the evolution of components of cost competitiveness re-
viewed in this section in real data, from 1995 to 2009. ULC is defined by total labour com-
3This list is clearly non-exhaustive, as other elements can affect efficiency. The adoption of ICT systems
has also been linked to increased efficiency and productivity. On this, one can see, for example, Milana and
Zeli (2002) and references therein. Others elements are organizational changes and emerging business models
such as outsourcing and use of knowledge intensive business services (KIBS).
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pensation (TLC) divided by labour. It is compiled by the OECD and is expressed in PPP.
Output is measured by GDP and labour by number of persons employed. GDP and em-
ployment series are from the Eurostat Economy and Finance database.4 Estimates of capital
stock are constructed using capital stock data from the EUKLEMS database and investment
series from Eurostat.5
The components of labour productivity are computed using Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) assuming constant returns to scale (Fare et al., 1994). The DEA method, based
on the concept of production possibility sets, evaluates the performance of each economic
units (countries/industries/firms) with reference to an efficient frontier, which identifies the
best-practise technology using convex combinations of observed inputs and outputs. One of
the main advantages of DEA is precisely that it computes different sources of TFP growth,
distinguishing the effect of efficiency changes from the effect of “pure” technical progress.
Another advantage is that measures of productivity are computed by using only the available
data, while making minimal assumptions on the functional form of the technology (sauf
returns to scale) or on market structure. The method, though computationally intensive, has
mild data requirements and is robust to changes in the data. A brief overview of DEA, with
some technical and computation details, is available in the appendix to this article.
2 Results
Table 1 shows that countries have experienced competitiveness losses from 1996 to 2009.
Notably, in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 recession ULC decreased in all countries, with the
exception of Luxembourg and United Kingdom.
Greece, United Kingdom and Portugal have experience the largest increase in ULC mov-
ing, respectively, from a value of 100 in 1995 to 161, 148 and 143 in 2010. (Spain’s ULC
growth is also high, but data is missing for the last year.) Countries with the lowest ULC are
Germany (104 in 2010, assuming a value of 100 in 1995), Austria (111) and Sweden (120).
The case of Germany is interesting in the light of a study of Soskice and Iversen (2001).
According to these authors, in a group of countries comprising the Netherlands, Belgium,
Austria and France, large companies increasingly relate their wage increases to unit labor
cost developments in Germany. The correlation of the ULC evolution in those countries to
the one of Germany ranges from 0.55 for France to 0.69 for Austria.
Interestingly, the countries hit by the debt crisis (Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal) are
among those that experienced the largest growth in ULC, which seems to support the ”internal
devaluation” view. Indeed, the highest deterioration in cost competitiveness occurred in
Greece (3.5% average per year) followed by the UK, Spain (2.7%), Portugal (2.6%) and Ireland
(2.5%). Italy’s ULC increased on average by 2.1% and, in contrast to other countries, failed
to decrease during the crisis. The rise in unit labor costs in Greece, relative to the other
eurozone countries, has been related to the inherent inability of the country’s trade union
movement to accept real wage increases for private-sector workers in line with productivity
developments (Katsimi and Moutos, 2010).
4The series have been converted using the PPP, which ensures comparability of aggregates across countries.
PPP allow researchers to express economic variables ‘as if’ they were recorded in a single common currency.
This takes into account not only nominal exchange rates but also the different price levels (purchasing powers)
across countries, and ensures that, for example, variables such as GDP reflect the actual size of an economy.
5Details on the method used to compute the capital stock are available in Dubrocard et al. (2010).
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What are the main determinants of ULC increases? Table 2 shows that the largest con-
tributor to the deterioration of cost competitiveness is the increase in labour compensation.
This is the case for all countries. One can also see that, exception made of Spain, Greece
and Italy, the growth rate of labour compensation is higher than ULC changes. This implies
that the evolution of labour productivity has compensated the effects of increases in labour
compensation, lowering the latter’s impact on ULC. In problematic countries, however, this
has not happened and a lack in productivity improvements has resulted in an even bigger
deterioration in competitiveness.
Table 3 sumarises the evolution of labour productivity in the countries analysed. One can
see that labour productivity performance was weak in all countries. Its average rate of growth
was barely higher than 1% in 5 european countries (Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland
and Sweden). Overall, labour productivity deteriorated in the years post-2000 and became
more volatile, with the possible exception of Germany. Labour productivity declined in
many countries during the recessions of 2001-2003, but this decline was more pronounced and
generalised in 2008 and 2009, with all countries recording negative rates of labour productivity
growth in both years.6
Labour productivity declined in Italy, Spain and Greece. Tables 4–6 show the evolution
of the components of labour productivity, respectively efficiency changes, technical progress,
and capital deepening. (Positive figures for the logarithm of efficiency change indicate that
efficiency gains have occurred.)
On average, most countries have realised efficiency gains. Efficiency has decreased only
in Belgium, Spain, Italy and Portugal. After realising some efficiency gains from 1995 to
1998, the US was on the frontier for the remaining of the period. The UK was on the
frontier since 2003. Also Ireland made, on average, an efficient use of inputs.7 Conversely, the
lack of technical progress or even technical regress, have worsened the cost competitiveness
performance of nearly all countries, by not reducing ULC. Only exceptions were Austria and
Belgium, whereas Luxembourg’s technical progress was absent (but, at least, not negative).
Whereas technical regress can be find in many studies at firm level (e.g. Sena, 2006),
industry level (e.g. Tortosa-Ausina et al., 2012) and country level (e.g. Chen and Yu, 2012),
only few authors have attempted to provide a plausible explanation of this result. For Lee
and Johnson (2012), technical regress is often attributed to production issues when in fact it
may result from lack of demand. Bontemps et al. (2012) emphasizes the negative effect of new
regulations that generate negative technical progress. Last, for Sena (2006) it is a consequence
of sharp recessions. Based on Caballero and Hammour (1994, 1996), this author argues that
during recessions old techniques are substituted by new techniques. If the process of destruc-
tion of old techniques is faster than the creation of new techniques, firms/industries/countries
are experiencing technical regress. The last term, capital deepening, has improved on average
for all countries and has contributed to increases the cost competitiveness (decreases in ULC).
6For detailed patterns of labour productivity and its relation with technical progress and efficiency changes,
one can see Peroni (2012).
7A zero log of efficiency means that a country is on the frontier, that is, it is making an efficient use of inputs
to production. This is a positive feature of the data for a country, but it also indicates that the country in
question can achieve further improvements in its economic performance only by realising substantial technical
gains.
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Figure 1: Decomposition of average ULC changes
3 Conclusions
Results presented in this study support the idea that policy targeted to restrain labour costs
should be mitigated by efforts to improve countries economic efficiency and technological
changes. Indeed, an approach based solely on the compression of labour costs has several
drawbacks; lower nominal wage growth is obviously less attractive than higher productiv-
ity growth (Blanchard, 2007) and has adverse social consequences. Such drawbacks make
the compression of nominal wages an unlikely and possibly unsustainable long term strategy
to foster economic growth. This strategy also assumes the absence of nominal wage rigidi-
ties, which is not supported by the data (Arpia and Pichelmann, 2007, founded significant
wage rigidity in the Euro Area). An alternative policy could be to lower employers’ social
contribution (as suggested in Siebert, 1999), which is unlikely, unless the aim is to reduce
unemployment (Marx, 2001). However, the decomposition of unit labour costs presented in
this document suggests that other options, such as structural reforms to foster capital deepen-
ing, new industrial organization to improve efficiency and research and development policies,
could be successful in fostering countries cost competitiveness. The burden of improving unit
labour cost should not fall only on labour market adjustment but also on structural reforms
and the design of new production systems. The decomposition proposed in this article em-
phasizes the important role of intangible, supporting the finding of Corrado et al. (2009).
Further research should aim to find conclusive empirical evidence that reducing unit labour
cost strengthen competitiveness of countries. It should also investigate what mix of intangible
assets explains efficiency gains and technical progress, and what is the optimal policy mix to
foster capital deepening. A possible extension of this work is the use of industry level data
to examine pattern of productivity and cost competitiveness across countries. Current issues
of data availability prevented this exercise, and this is left for future work.
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Table 1: Growth rates of ULC (%) 1995-2009
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 mean
AT -0.5% -0.2% 0.0% -0.1% 0.8% 0.2% 1.3% -0.7% 0.6% 1.0% 0.7% 3.3% 4.6% -0.6% 0.7%
BE 0.2% 1.1% 1.4% 0.4% 4.2% 2.3% 1.0% -0.6% 1.4% 1.8% 2.1% 4.3% 4.3% -0.5% 1.7%
DE -1.0% 0.3% 0.7% 0.5% 0.3% 0.5% 0.9% -0.4% -0.9% -2.4% -1.0% 2.2% 5.8% -1.5% 0.3%
DK 1.0% 3.4% 1.9% 1.0% 4.1% 3.5% 2.1% 0.3% 1.9% 2.1% 4.4% 6.2% 4.7% -1.1% 2.5%
ES 1.8% 1.8% 1.7% 2.7% 3.1% 2.8% 2.8% 2.3% 3.1% 3.1% 4.0% 4.7% 1.0% 2.7%
FI -1.1% 1.3% 0.7% 0.6% 3.6% 0.8% 0.8% -0.1% 2.2% 0.3% 0.5% 5.8% 7.3% -1.5% 1.5%
FR 0.2% -0.2% 0.8% 1.6% 2.2% 2.9% 2.0% 1.0% 1.8% 1.8% 1.5% 3.0% 3.1% 1.7%
GR 9.2% 4.7% 2.9% 1.4% -0.7% 9.4% 1.7% 1.9% 3.5% 1.6% 3.4% 5.8% 5.4% -1.6% 3.5%
IE -0.1% 5.4% 1.1% 2.7% 5.9% 0.8% 3.7% 3.9% 5.2% 3.8% 3.9% 5.0% -1.3% -5.6% 2.5%
IT 2.7% -2.1% 1.5% 0.3% 3.2% 3.4% 4.0% 1.7% 3.1% 1.7% 2.2% 3.9% 3.8% 0.0% 2.1%
LU -0.1% -1.0% 0.7% 2.5% 6.3% 2.2% 1.4% 1.2% 2.1% 1.2% 1.6% 6.0% 8.2% 1.7% 2.4%
NL 1.0% 2.5% 1.8% 3.2% 4.5% 4.5% 2.4% 0.4% -0.3% 0.7% 1.6% 2.6% 5.1% -0.8% 2.1%
PT 3.9% 3.3% 2.3% 4.3% 3.8% 3.2% 3.8% 1.0% 3.5% 0.9% 1.2% 3.4% 3.2% -1.4% 2.6%
SE 0.8% 0.1% -1.2% 4.9% 5.0% 0.5% 0.5% -1.0% 0.4% -0.7% 4.1% 2.7% 4.6% -1.9% 1.3%
UK 2.4% 3.9% 2.4% 2.7% 3.3% 2.1% 2.9% 1.7% 2.5% 2.5% 2.9% 2.3% 6.0% 2.2% 2.9%
US 1.5% 2.8% 1.4% 3.6% 2.1% 0.3% 2.0% 1.4% 2.3% 3.0% 2.8% 2.8% 0.3% -1.0% 1.8%
Note: data are yearly changes, so that figures for 1996 reflect changes of variable
from 1996 to 1997. Data is missing for Spain and France in 2009. (Sources:
author’s calculations form Eurostat, OECD, Statec data.)
Table 2: Growth rates of labour compensation (%) 1995-2009
Country1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 mean
AT 2.3% 3.1% 2.9% 4.2% -2.4% 4.0% 2.1% 2.2% -0.6% 3.5% 0.9% 0.1% -0.3% 2.0% 1.7%
BE 3.8% -0.2% 4.9% 5.5% 2.7% 5.7% -0.5% -0.5% 0.3% 2.2% 2.5% 0.7% 0.0% 3.1% 2.2%
DE 1.7% 1.2% 3.5% 2.8% 1.2% 2.2% 3.3% 2.6% 2.2% 1.3% 1.0% -0.1% -1.3% 2.8% 1.7%
DK 3.5% 4.4% 3.8% 4.8% 1.8% 5.5% 0.1% 4.6% 0.0% 3.5% 3.9% 1.4% 0.6% 4.8% 3.1%
ES 2.5% 1.7% 1.1% 2.6% 1.3% 3.6% -0.6% 1.0% 0.8% 4.3% 5.1% 2.8% 2.5% 2.2%
FI 2.9% 3.7% 3.2% 4.7% 1.3% 2.2% 1.2% 7.0% 2.4% 2.8% 4.2% 2.1% 0.6% 4.8% 3.1%
FR 3.7% 2.1% 3.6% 4.9% 3.2% 4.4% -1.5% 3.0% 3.6% 2.5% 3.0% -1.3% -0.1% 2.4%
GR 9.9% 0.1% 4.2% 5.8% 2.9% 11.9% 1.3% 2.7% 1.3% 2.6% 2.7% 4.7% 0.0% -3.5% 3.3%
IE 2.4% 1.4% 0.1% 3.9% 2.8% 3.5% 4.2% 5.6% 4.1% 4.5% 7.6% -0.5% 2.4% 4.8% 3.3%
IT 3.9% -0.8% 1.7% 1.7% 2.7% -2.7% 0.8% 0.4% 2.8% 2.8% 4.0% 1.6% -1.4% 0.0% 1.3%
LU 2.1% 1.8% 5.7% 5.5% 1.0% 4.1% -0.4% 5.2% 0.2% 3.8% 2.1% -0.1% -0.5% 3.1% 2.4%
NL 2.6% 4.1% 4.9% 6.5% 1.4% 4.2% -0.2% 5.3% 1.6% 2.6% 3.8% -0.1% -0.7% 4.5% 2.9%
PT 4.4% 2.3% 5.5% 5.8% 1.6% 2.6% 3.0% 1.0% 8.0% 2.3% 3.4% 0.3% 3.1% 3.4% 3.3%
SE 4.8% 1.7% 3.2% 8.7% 0.3% 2.5% 2.8% 6.2% -0.8% 2.2% 6.8% -2.3% -2.9% 3.4% 2.6%
UK 5.5% 4.7% 4.4% 8.1% 4.9% 2.9% 1.9% 4.7% 1.9% 3.0% 1.5% -2.0% -0.5% 4.0% 3.2%
US 4.3% 5.6% 5.7% 5.4% 1.6% 2.0% 2.9% 3.5% 2.5% 0.9% 3.1% -1.4% -2.1% 4.7% 2.8%
(Sources: author’s calculations form Eurostat, OECD, Statec data.)
Table 3: Labour productivity growth (2000-2009): yearly changes (%)
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 mean
AT 3.4% 2.8% 3.4% 2.9% 4.4% -3.1% 3.9% 0.8% 3.0% -1.2% 2.5% 0.1% -3.1% -4.8% 1.1%
BE 2.1% 3.7% -1.3% 3.6% 5.2% -1.4% 3.5% -1.5% 0.1% -1.1% 0.5% 0.4% -3.6% -4.2% 0.6%
DE 3.2% 2.8% 0.8% 2.9% 2.3% 0.9% 1.7% 2.4% 3.0% 3.2% 3.7% 2.0% -2.3% -6.9% 1.6%
DK 3.2% 2.6% 1.0% 1.9% 3.9% -2.4% 2.1% -2.0% 4.4% -1.9% 1.5% -0.4% -4.7% -4.0% 0.7%
ES 0.5% 0.7% 0.0% -0.6% -0.1% -1.8% 0.8% -3.3% -1.3% -2.3% 1.1% 1.1% -1.9% 1.5% -0.2%
FI 2.7% 4.0% 2.4% 2.5% 4.2% -2.2% 1.3% 0.5% 7.3% 0.2% 2.5% 3.7% -3.6% -6.4% 1.6%
FR 2.0% 3.6% 2.3% 2.9% 3.4% 1.0% 1.5% -3.5% 2.0% 1.8% 0.7% 1.5% -4.3% -3.1% 1.0%
GR -1.7% 0.6% -4.6% 1.4% 4.5% 3.6% 2.5% -0.4% 0.7% -2.2% 1.0% -0.7% -1.1% -5.3% -0.3%
IE 7.9% 2.5% -3.9% -1.0% 1.2% -3.0% 2.7% 0.5% 1.7% -1.1% 0.6% 3.8% -5.3% 3.7% 1.3%
IT -1.0% 1.3% 1.3% 0.3% 1.4% -0.5% -6.0% -3.2% -1.3% -0.3% 1.1% 1.8% -2.3% -5.1% -0.9%
LU 0.1% 2.2% 2.9% 5.1% 3.0% -5.2% 2.0% -1.8% 4.1% -1.9% 2.6% 0.6% -6.0% -8.4% 0.0%
NL 2.9% 1.6% 1.6% 3.1% 3.4% -3.1% -0.3% -2.6% 5.0% 1.9% 2.0% 2.2% -2.7% -5.7% 0.9%
PT 1.2% 0.5% -1.0% 3.3% 1.5% -2.2% -0.6% -0.8% 0.0% 4.6% 1.4% 2.3% -3.1% -0.1% 0.8%
SE 4.8% 4.1% 1.6% 4.5% 3.9% -4.5% 2.0% 2.4% 7.4% -1.2% 2.9% 2.8% -4.9% -7.2% 1.5%
UK 2.8% 3.1% 0.8% 2.0% 5.5% 1.6% 0.8% -1.0% 3.0% -0.5% 0.5% -1.4% -4.2% -6.3% 0.5%
US 3.3% 2.8% 2.8% 4.4% 1.7% -0.5% 1.7% 0.9% 2.1% 0.3% -2.1% 0.3% -4.1% -2.4% 1.1%
(Sources: author’s calculations form Eurostat, Statec data.)
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Table 4: Logs of efficiency 1995-2009
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 mean
AT -0.001 0.038 -0.015 0.019 -0.018 0.017 0.001 0.004 -0.010 0.036 0.002 0.014 -0.015 -0.039 0.002
BE 0.010 -0.005 -0.007 0.026 0.000 0.015 -0.016 -0.017 -0.010 0.018 0.002 0.008 -0.010 -0.030 -0.001
DE 0.000 0.025 -0.008 0.006 0.020 -0.002 0.001 0.003 0.025 0.051 0.017 0.019 -0.041 -0.014 0.007
DK -0.014 0.033 0.007 0.016 0.005 -0.005 -0.012 0.020 0.004 0.010 -0.005 -0.010 -0.015 -0.005 0.002
ES -0.018 0.011 -0.045 -0.016 0.000 -0.011 -0.028 -0.024 -0.012 0.003 -0.003 0.010 0.034 -0.036 -0.008
FI 0.016 0.037 -0.014 0.024 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.027 0.010 0.033 0.033 0.007 -0.052 0.005 0.010
FR 0.009 0.034 -0.013 0.015 0.016 -0.002 -0.036 -0.003 0.011 0.024 0.010 -0.001 -0.004 -0.031 0.005
GR -0.010 0.016 -0.004 -0.001 0.046 -0.003 0.014 0.010 -0.007 0.012 0.005 0.011 0.005 -0.062 0.002
IE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.008 -0.005 0.009 -0.039 0.012 0.030 0.000
IT -0.014 0.023 -0.036 -0.003 0.007 -0.048 -0.028 -0.013 -0.006 0.007 0.005 -0.001 -0.021 -0.023 -0.011
LU 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NL -0.008 0.027 -0.011 0.014 -0.019 -0.014 -0.022 0.012 0.011 0.036 0.019 0.016 -0.025 -0.012 0.002
PT -0.065 -0.030 -0.048 -0.040 -0.017 -0.041 -0.044 -0.020 -0.010 -0.001 0.013 0.009 0.028 0.011 -0.018
SE 0.014 0.045 0.030 0.025 0.000 0.008 0.028 0.052 0.013 0.022 0.014 -0.014 -0.024 0.019 0.017
UK -0.009 0.018 -0.001 0.009 0.028 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004
US 0.002 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
(Sources: author’s calculations form Eurostat, Statec data.)
Table 5: Logs of technical progress 1995-2009
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 mean
AT 0.022 -0.011 0.037 0.015 -0.015 0.011 0.002 0.020 -0.002 -0.014 0.001 -0.042 -0.035 0.062 0.004
BE 0.022 -0.008 0.037 0.016 -0.016 0.011 0.002 0.020 -0.001 -0.015 0.000 -0.042 -0.034 0.061 0.004
DE 0.022 -0.022 0.019 0.001 -0.026 -0.003 -0.002 0.012 -0.004 -0.018 0.000 -0.041 -0.030 0.049 -0.003
DK 0.007 -0.033 -0.001 0.001 -0.032 0.000 -0.012 -0.008 -0.017 -0.014 -0.014 -0.035 -0.048 0.019 -0.013
ES 0.022 -0.014 0.036 0.010 -0.022 0.000 -0.004 0.002 -0.013 -0.017 -0.011 -0.037 -0.031 0.059 -0.006
FI 0.022 -0.014 0.035 0.009 -0.023 -0.004 -0.006 0.005 -0.011 -0.017 -0.010 -0.034 -0.035 0.040 -0.003
FR 0.022 -0.014 0.035 0.011 -0.012 0.008 0.004 0.011 -0.005 -0.019 0.000 -0.041 -0.030 0.055 -0.002
GR -0.001 -0.031 -0.016 -0.008 -0.041 -0.001 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.012 -0.015 -0.036 -0.054 0.011 -0.018
IE 0.011 -0.035 -0.014 -0.008 -0.042 -0.010 -0.024 -0.015 -0.019 -0.014 -0.014 -0.035 -0.038 0.058 -0.014
IT 0.022 -0.019 0.027 0.005 -0.022 -0.003 -0.008 -0.004 -0.016 -0.015 -0.013 -0.034 -0.043 0.022 -0.007
LU 0.021 0.028 0.047 0.031 -0.048 0.016 -0.019 0.035 -0.015 0.023 0.007 -0.058 -0.087 0.013 0.000
NL 0.022 -0.014 0.036 0.013 -0.011 0.001 -0.004 0.008 -0.006 -0.019 -0.001 -0.041 -0.033 0.038 -0.001
PT -0.001 -0.031 -0.016 -0.016 -0.046 -0.022 -0.019 -0.007 -0.017 -0.014 -0.019 -0.035 -0.065 -0.003 -0.022
SE 0.022 -0.030 0.003 0.001 -0.033 0.002 -0.020 -0.015 -0.020 -0.013 -0.015 -0.035 -0.050 0.015 -0.013
UK -0.001 -0.031 -0.016 -0.016 -0.046 -0.022 -0.019 -0.005 -0.016 -0.011 -0.018 -0.036 -0.065 -0.001 -0.022
US 0.022 -0.019 0.027 0.007 -0.018 0.003 0.002 0.012 -0.005 -0.019 -0.007 -0.037 -0.035 0.038 -0.002
(Sources: author’s calculations form Eurostat, Statec data.)
Table 6: Logs of capital deepening 1995-2009
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 mean
AT 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.009 0.005 0.005 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.003 0.004
BE 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.005 0.002
DE 0.005 0.006 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.022 0.025 0.016 0.010 0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.007 0.010
DK 0.032 0.010 0.013 0.022 0.003 0.025 0.004 0.030 -0.006 0.019 0.015 -0.003 0.022 0.045 0.017
ES 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.019 -0.002 0.009 0.002 0.025 0.024 0.008 0.012 0.009 0.009
FI 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.007 -0.004 0.015 0.010 0.038 0.004 0.008 0.013 -0.010 0.021 0.019 0.009
FR 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 -0.003 0.012 0.013 0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.003 0.006 0.005
GR 0.017 -0.031 0.034 0.053 0.030 0.029 0.000 0.015 0.003 0.010 0.004 0.014 -0.005 0.031 0.014
IE 0.014 -0.005 0.004 0.020 0.011 0.036 0.029 0.032 0.016 0.025 0.042 0.018 0.062 0.016 0.023
IT 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.010 -0.011 0.004 0.004 0.019 0.019 0.027 0.012 0.011 0.001 0.009
LU 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.005 0.003 0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000
NL 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.007 -0.002 0.010 -0.001 0.028 0.013 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.026 0.007
PT 0.072 0.051 0.096 0.071 0.041 0.057 0.055 0.028 0.072 0.029 0.028 -0.006 0.036 0.041 0.048
SE 0.004 0.001 0.011 0.012 -0.014 0.010 0.016 0.035 -0.005 0.019 0.029 -0.001 -0.001 0.019 0.010
UK 0.041 0.022 0.036 0.061 0.035 0.028 0.000 0.035 0.010 0.016 0.004 -0.006 0.000 0.019 0.021
US 0.004 0.007 0.016 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.007 0.009 0.008 -0.002 0.009 -0.005 0.010 0.018 0.009
(Sources: author’s calculations form Eurostat, Statec data.)
A Appendix: the DEA method to measure efficiency,
technical gains, and productivity
The calculations of TFP components carried out in this article uses a framework originally
developed by Farrell (1957) for measuring the productive efficiency of economic units. In this
framework, production sets and distance functions generalise the idea of production function.
Production sets define technology in terms of feasible input/output sets; distance functions
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measure operating efficiency by comparing observed output to the boundary of the production
set (the frontier). Distance functions offer a mean of comparing different units in terms of
their position to the frontier, and to study the evolution of the units’ performance when the
structure of technology changes.
Assume that each economic unit — or Decision Making Unit (DMU) — produces a sin-
gle output, denoted by y, using a vector of input x ∈ RN+ .8 Formally, the production
possibility set in period t is as follows:
St = {(xt, yt) : xt can produce yt}; (5)
Here, The set S represents all feasible input/output vectors (x, y) such that using x one can
produce y. The boundary of S, the frontier, gives the maximum output obtainable from a
given amount of inputs use. DMUs operating on the frontier are said to be efficient because
they make full use of the inputs. The output distance function describes all operating
DMUs in terms of their relative position to the frontier:
Dt(xt, yt) = inf{θ : (xt, yt
θ
) ∈ St, θ ≥ 0}; (6)
Here, D gives the smallest (infimum) of the set of real numbers θ, where θ is such that the
input/output combination (xt, yt) belongs to the production possibility set St.
9 Dt(xt, yt)
measures the reciprocal of the required expansion in output given inputs xt to attain the
frontier defined by St. D takes the value of 1 for those DMUs on the frontier and less than 1
for those DMUs below the frontier. Larger values of D are associated to units closer to the
frontier.
The DEA method (Charnes et al., 1978) provides a way of computing distance functions.
DEA selects the most efficient unit for each observed combination of input (that is, the unit
which produces the highest amount of output), and constructs the frontier by joining the set
of points represented by those efficient units. This is done by solving the following linear
programming problem (LP):
maxλ,Φ λ0 (7)
s.t.
∑J
j=1 xijφj ≤ xi0, for every i
−∑Jj=1 yjφj + λ0y0 ≤ 0
Φ, λ ≥ 0
Here, the subscripts i and j index, respectively, inputs and DMUs; Φ is a vector (J x 1) of
coefficients for the DMUs; λ is a score to be maximized. (The subscript 0 indicates that the
problem is solved with respect to a reference DMUs.) Intuitively, the LP problem above seeks
the biggest possible expansion of the output of DMU0, while remaining within the feasibility
set. The solution gives a score for each DMU, λ∗0; the efficiency measure for DMU0 is equal
to the reciprocal of such score: E0 = 1/λ
∗
0. The DMUs with a score equal to 1 will define the
efficient frontier.10
8Economic units, object of the efficiency analysis, may indicate firms, industries, regions, countries.
9The term infimum denotes the lowest bound of the set θ.
10The formulation of problem 7, also referred to as the envelopment form, represents the dual of a non-linear
fractional problem. Charnes et al. (1978) shows how the original problem, which minimises a ratio of input on
output, can be transformed into a linear score problem. This clarifies the link between the linear program and
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Clearly this method avoids the use of a tightly specified production function for which
parameters should be estimated, but it is computationally intensive. Moreover, this approach
does not require assumptions on the market structure (ie perfect competition), and permits
different specifications of returns to scale technologies. Distance functions can also be used
to construct productivity indices, as outline in the remaining of this appendix.
Caves et al. (1982) first proposed the use of the Malmquist index to measure productivity
changes. Given two time period t and t + 1, the Malmquist index of productivity is defined
as follows:
M t,t+1 =
[(
Dt(xt+1, yt+1)
Dt(xt, yt)
)(
Dt+1(xt+1, yt+1)
Dt+1(xt, yt)
)] 1
2
; (8)
The index is given by the ratio of distance functions obtained by comparing output to inputs
in time t and time t + 1 using a given reference technology. (Here, the geometric averages
of indices obtained using both St and St+1 production sets avoids the arbitrary choice of a
reference technology.) In other words, equation 8 considers how much a unit could produce
using the inputs available in t + 1, if it used the technology at time t, and how much a unit
could produce using the inputs available in t, if it used the technology available in t+1.11 Fare
et al. (1994) showed that equation 8 can be decomposed into efficiency gains and technical
progress, as follows:
M t,t+1 =
Dt+1(xt+1, yt+1)
Dt(xt, yt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
efficiency gains
[(
Dt(xt+1, yt+1)
Dt+1(xt+1, yt+1)
)(
Dt(xt, yt)
Dt+1(xt, yt)
)] 1
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
technical progress
; (9)
Here, the first term — a ratio of distances to the frontiers in period t and t+ 1 — represents
the pure change in efficiency. The second term, which measures the shifts in the frontier,
provides a measure of technical change.12 This is achieved by comparing, for the same level
of inputs (in t or t+ 1), the distance functions obtained under the technology in t and t+ 1.
(Once again, we have a geometric mean of ratios obtained under the technology in t and
t+ 1.)
the measurement of productive efficiency. The score formulation reduces the dimensionality of the problem as
the number of constraints is equal to I (number of inputs) rather than J (number of DMU). The optimisation
problem presented here is an output-oriented version, but it is also possible to formulate the problem as an
input-oriented one. In the latter case, we seek the biggest possible reduction in inputs’ use, while keeping
output levels constant.
11One can see that practical implementation requires the solution of 4 LP problems.
12In this framework, technical change means an expansion of the production possibility set.
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